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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a framework, named
as A-MAKE, which efficiently provides security, privacy, and
accountability for communications in wireless mesh networks.
More specifically, the framework provides an anonymous mutual
authentication protocol whereby legitimate users can connect to
network from anywhere without being identified or tracked. No
single party (e.g., network operator) can violate the privacy of
a user, which is provided in our framework in the strongest
sense. Our framework utilizes group signatures, where the private
key and the credentials of the users are generated through a
secure three-party protocol. User accountability is implemented
via user revocation protocol that can be executed by two semi-
trusted authorities, one of which is the network operator. The
assumptions about the trust level of the network operator are
relaxed. Our framework makes use of much more efficient
signature generation and verification algorithms in terms of
computation complexity than their counterparts in literature,
where signature size is comparable to the shortest signatures
proposed for similar purposes so far.
Index Terms—Wireless Mesh Networks; Anonymous Authen-
tication; Pairing; Group Signatures;
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) emerge as a promising
technology to provide low cost and scalable solutions for high
speed Internet access and additional services. Thus, it is no
surprise that it has been the focus of increasing attention of
all quarters from research community to industry and military.
A WMN is a dynamically self-organized and self-configured
network, where nodes automatically establish and maintain
mesh connectivity in a collaborative fashion. The collaborative
nature of the mesh networks results in low up-front cost,
easy network maintenance, robustness and reliable service
coverage [1].
In their simplest form, WMNs are comprised of mesh
routers and mesh clients (network users) such as desktops,
laptops, phones, etc. Hybrid architectures [1] (cf. Fig. 1) are the
most popular since both mesh routers and mesh users perform
routing and configuration functionalities for other user nodes
to help improve the connectivity and coverage of the network.
In order to achieve wide user-acceptance and deployment
of WMNs, security and privacy concerns of users need to
be addressed in an efficient manner. Effective access control
mechanisms to guarantee the registered users a reliable net-
work connectivity and other security services for the protection
of network communication are among the essentials due to the
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Fig. 1. Hybrid WMN architecture
dynamic and open nature of the network. By the same token,
the services delivered to users may violate their privacy since
they need to be authenticated first to connect to the network.
Another related issue is user accountability, which aims to
detect misbehaving users and, if needed, to deny network
access to them via revoking. However, access control, security,
user privacy and accountability can be conflicting objectives,
which may not be easy to reconcile in the same framework.
In WMNs, it is essential to provide legitimate, privacy-
aware network users with anonymous access to the network
while unauthorized access by all others must be prevented. It is
not immediately obvious as to how to block unregistered users
when everybody is anonymous in the network. Furthermore,
protecting the network from misbehaving users requires ”iden-
tification” capability built into the network to achieve user
accountability whereby users are held accountable for their
(unacceptable) actions. Identification capability and anonymity
are indeed conflicting goals since while the latter is trying to
hide the user identity, the former is trying to reveal it.
In this paper, we propose a framework that is a collection
of protocols to manage these conflicting objectives success-
fully. More formally; Security, User Privacy (Anonymity +
Unlinkability), User Accountability and Key Revocation are
the objectives efficiently achieved in our framework.
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In our framework, users connect to the WMN using an
anonymous mutual authentication protocol based on group
signatures [8] where both signature generation and verifica-
tion operations are efficient. Since the signature scheme is
anonymous and unlinkable it is not possible to identify and
track users, thus providing them with strong privacy. User
accountability is achieved through an efficient user revocation
protocol that can be executed only by a coalition of certain
semi-trusted non-colluding parties. The revocation protocol
can also be used for the users whose subscriptions expire while
the backward security is guaranteed for users who are revoked.
Our framework is practical and its protocols outperform sim-
ilar protocols proposed for WMNs in literature [9].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, background
information on pairings and group signatures are given and
related work is discussed. In Section III, our construction is in-
troduced. Then, detailed description of our security framework
for privacy preserving authentication and key establishment
will be given. In Section IV, security and privacy properties
along with the performance analysis of our scheme will be
examined. And Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The proposed framework makes use of anonymous group
signatures, based on primitives such as elliptic curve arithmetic
and pairing operations. Here, we give a brief introduction to
bilinear pairings and group signatures utilized in our construc-
tion assuming an ample knowledge on elliptic curves.
Let G1, G2 and GM be cyclic groups of some large prime
order q. Then, eˆ : G1 ×G2 → GM is a bilinear map, which
is efficiently computable and has the following property:
Bilinearity: ∀P ∈ G1, and ∀Q ∈ G2, and ∀a, b ∈ Zq,
eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P,Q)ab.
In our construction, we use additive groups of elliptic curves
for G1 and G2, and multiplicative group in an extension of a
finite field for GM .
Group signatures are first introduced by Chaum and Heyst
[7], which allow a group member to sign a message on
behalf of the group without revealing its identity. Group sig-
natures have been adopted in diverse application areas where
anonymity is required [8, 9]. One of the most recent group
signature application is the Direct Anonymous Attestation
(DAA) scheme, which is originally proposed in [6].
A related framework for Accountable and Anonymous Au-
thentication is proposed in Tsang et al. [10], in which service
providers (SPs) authenticate users. In this work, there is no
trusted third party (TTP) and accountability is provided by the
blacklists of users that are held at SP side. Thus, the framework
provides accountability on the SP side only. Therefore, it is
not suitable for WMNs, where distributed accountability is
required.
Ren and Lou [9] propose a more related framework to
ours called PEACE which stands for SoPhisticated privacy-
Enhanced yet Accountable seCurity framEwork for WMNs.
PEACE is the first scheme that demonstrates that two conflict-
ing goals, namely user privacy and accountability, can co-exist
in a practical and efficient framework. In PEACE, privacy is
achieved through the use of short group signature scheme by
Boneh and Shacham [5].
In PEACE, privacy against the network operator (NO)
is obtained via the late binding of private keys by group
managers to their corresponding users. Simply put, in late
binding, the group manager (GM) determines which user will
get which private key; and with the help of TTP, a user in
the group can reconstruct its designated key. Although NO
generates all the private keys, it is not a part of the late binding
process and does not know user-private key mapping. NO can
extract a private key used in a group signature, and determine
the group id, and revoke all the private keys in that group.
It, however, cannot trace it to the specific user who actually
generates the signature. If any two of the three parties, i.e.,
the NO, the TTP, and the GM, collude, privacy and security
can be forfeited for any given user.
Although the NO cannot reveal the identity of a specific user
by only knowing the key used in a signature, it can trace any
signature up to its group and use this information to violate
the anonymity of the signer. Furthermore, the NO can link
two anonymous signatures generated by the same user. The
question here is ”Is it sufficient to hide the identity of the
user to protect his privacy?” This question reminds us of the
infamous AOL Internet web search data release case that is a
paramount example of privacy breach [3].
In this incident an AOL user whose identity was suppressed
was easily tracked down and re-identified by knowing the
web pages she visited. In summary, if we de-identify a user
but allow him to be tracked, then we violate the privacy of
that user. In PEACE, NO can track down the users in the
network. Since the NO deploys the mesh routers and forms a
well connected wireless mesh network (WMN), it can collect
valuable data such as location and time of users’ connections
to the network.
Conclusion, then, is that user private keys should not be
given to or generated by a single entity, especially by the NO
due to its advantageously situated position. Furthermore, the
NO generally is not the best choice for acting as the authorized
party that we can easily bestow the trust of users; not to
mention the cost associated with bearing such trust.
In PEACE the verification algorithm needs to check whether
the signer is in user revocation list (UserRL) by computing
two costly pairings per user in the list, which degrades
the performance. Thus, a more efficient user revocation list
checking algorithm is needed to enhance the performance of
the framework.
III. A-MAKE: ANONYMOUS AND ACCOUNTABLE
MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT
To address security and privacy concerns in WMNs in an
efficient manner, we propose a privacy preserving mutual
authentication and key agreement scheme with revocation
capabilities. Our mutual authentication and key agreement
protocol is based on the anonymous group signature used in
DAA scheme proposed by Chen et al. [8]. In this section,
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we give the details of our anonymous and accountable mutual
authentication and key agreement framework (A-MAKE).
A. Network Architecture and Problem Formulation
Our WMN architecture comprises four entities; a network
operator (NO), a trusted third party (TTP), mesh routers
(MRs), and network users (NUs).
NO deploys a number of access points and mesh routers
in order to provide network services to users. Network users
subscribe to NO to use the network from anywhere within
the WMN. In order to provide network access only to the
legitimate users and protect network against malicious users,
NO authenticates them via mesh routers. In addition, whenever
it detects a misbehaving user or whenever a user’s subscription
period ends, it revokes the user and denies further access to
the user. Naturally, the NO cannot be trusted to perform the
revocation process by itself since this means the compromise
of the user identity. Therefore, we stipulate that a revocation
process requires involvement of both the TTP and the NO.
In WMNs, users connect to the network through both mesh
routers and other users already connected to the network. Users
that act as routers should also be able to authenticate the
other users that are outside the range of mesh routers but still
need to connect to the network. In addition, users must use
necessary cryptographic means to protect their communication
against eavesdropping, altering, and also sophisticated attacks
aimed to compromise privacy. As a result, there is a need
for a privacy preserving mutual authentication scheme with
revocation capabilities for anonymous authorization of users
and for a key agreement scheme to provide confidentiality and
integrity.
The primary job of the TTP is to participate in the Join
protocol (Section III-B2) for the generation of private keys and
an associated credential for a user. The Join protocol gives the
user a private key while the NO and the TTP obtains a share
of it (without knowing the other party’s share).
In order to provide confidentiality and integrity, a key agree-
ment scheme is incorporated into the authentication scheme
(Section III-B3).
Users that have the private key and the associated credential
can perform two-party mutual authentication and key agree-
ment protocol, MAKE, by mesh routers and other users. User
accountability is achieved through user revocation protocol
(Section III-C), which needs to bring the NO and the TTP
together to revoke a user.
We have two important assumptions on TTP and NO. TTP
and NO are semi-trusted non-colluding parties that follow the
steps of the protocols. This is a relaxation compared to fully
trusted model where trusted parties are usually in possession
of private keys as is the case with [9]. An entity which is
similar to a certificate authority (CA) in classical public key
setting is an example as to how TTP is implemented in real
world. Since user registration is performed once for every user
and revocation of users is needed occasionally, TTP does not
have to be highly accessible.
B. Our Construction
A-MAKE framework consists of four protocols (Setup, Join,
MAKE, Revoke). In the following, we specify the detailed
steps of the first three of these protocols.
1) Setup: Given the security parameter 1k as the input,
TTP performs the following steps:
1) Generates two groups G1, G2 of prime order q ≈ 2k
for which an asymmetric pairing can be defined. Solving
decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDHP) and Gap-
DLP [8] in G1 is computationally hard,
2) Selects two generators P1, P2 such that G1 = 〈P1〉, G2 =
〈P2〉,
3) Selects a pairing such that eˆ : G1 × G2 → GM , where
GM is a multiplicative group of order q and the DLP in
GM is computationally hard,
4) Determines hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq along with
a key generating function HK : G1 → Zq,
5) Generates its own public and private keys
a) Private key: (x, y) and x, y R←− Zq,
b) Public key: (X,Y ) ← (xP2, yP2) ∈ G2
6) Publishes public parameters, {G1, G2, GM , eˆ, q, P1, P2,
H1,HK , (X,Y )}
2) Join: The Join protocol is a three-party protocol that
involves the user, the TTP and the NO. In this protocol, the
NO, the TTP, and the user jointly generates the user private
key, which is fully known only to the user. The NO and the
TTP have its random shares, which contain no information
about the private key. They store these shares along with
corresponding user identities for revocation purposes in future.
User privacy is guaranteed against the TTP and the NO) and
the user can anonymously authenticate that it is a legitimate
member of the network. In the following, protocol steps of the
Join protocol for network user NUi are described. Note that
conventional PKC can be used for Steps 1, 2.c, 4.c, and 5.a.
1) NUi generates a random number rUSi R←− Zq and sends
it protected to NO
2) NO (for user NUi where ’i’ is the user identity)
a) Generates randomly the partial key fNOi R←− Zq
b) Keeps the binding (i, fNOi)
c) Sends rUSi + fNOi protected to TTP together with
fNOi · P1
3) TTP (for NUi)
a) Generates randomly the partial key fTTPi R←− Zq
b) Stores the binding (i, fTTPi)
c) Computes ftemp ← rUSi+fNOi+fTTPi and fTTPi ·P1
d) Calculates FNUi ← fNOi · P1 + fTTPi · P11
4) TTP (generation of the credential for NUi)
a) Generates a random number r R←− Zq
b) Calculates the credential
i) Ai ← rP1;Bi ← yAi;Ci ← (xAi + rxyFNUi)
ii) credi ← (Ai, Bi, Ci)
1This value is used in generation of the NUi’s credential.
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c) Encrypts both; ECi ← EncPKNUi (credi, ftemp),
d) Sends ECi to NUi
5) NUi
a) Decrypts ECi in order to obtain the credential,
(credi, ftemp) ← DecSKNUi (ECi)
b) Calculates its private key fi ← ftemp−rUSi and Ei =
fi ·Bi
c) Checks if the credential is generated appropriately:
If eˆ(Ai, Y ) 
= eˆ(Bi, P2) or eˆ(Ai+Ei, X) 
= eˆ(Ci, P2),
then abort protocol2.
3) MAKE - Mutual Authentication and Key agrEement:
MAKE allows a user to authenticate itself to the network
anonymously and obtain a symmetric secret key. It consists
of three parts; namely, Sign, Key eXchange (KX), and Verify.
First, we analyze the case when a user tries to connect to
the network using a mesh router, and then give discussion for
the case where a user acts as the router. For the latter case,
user, which acts as a router in user-user authentication, should
have UserRL in order to avoid granting rogue network users
access to the network. Thus, UserRL is sent to a network user
whenever it requests for it from any one of the Mesh Routers
in a related beacon. So, in the following, it is assumed that all
the agents acting as a relaying agent has the UserRL at their
side. Alternative solution is that the user acting as a router
gets help from a router to perform this check.
• MAKE for User-Router Interaction (MAKE-UR)
1) MR broadcasts a beacon periodically that contains an
authentication payload (The following four steps are
almost the same as those in [9]):
a) Picks a random nonce rMR R←− Zq, a time stamp
tsMR and a random generator PMR ∈ G1
b) Computes TMR ← rMR · PMR
c) Signs PMR, TMR and tsMR using a conventional
digital signature algorithm (e.g., ECDSA):
σMR ← SignSKMR(PMR, TMR, tsMR)
d) Broadcasts MsgMR ← {PMR, TMR, tsMR, σMR,
CertMR} as a part of the beacon.
2) NU , upon receipt of MsgMR, authenticates MR:
a) Checks if the timestamp tsMR is fresh
b) Validates the CertMR using Online Certificate Sta-
tus Protocol (OCSP) or with a similar protocol
depending on the infrastructure design.
c) Verifies signature σMR generated by MR. (non-
anonymous authentication via conventional PKC).
3) NU authenticates itself to MR and initiates the au-
thenticated key-exchange algorithm:
a) For symmetric key establishment, NU
i) Picks a random nonce rNU R←− Zq and com-
putes TNU ← rNU · PMR
ii) Calculates mutual key using HK :
KUR ← HK(rNU · TMR)
b) For signature generation, NU
2This step is necessary also for checking the correctness of private key fi
i) Generates timestamp tsNU to prove freshness
ii) Generates a random point, J R←− G1, and a
random number t R←− Zq
iii) Randomizes the credential
(A′, B′, C ′) ← (t ·A, t ·B, t · C)
iv) Calculate signature proofs of knowledge
A) K ← fi · J
B) Selects a random value z R←− Zq
C) Calculates pairing value to be supplied into
the challenge and the witness
ρ
′
D ← eˆ(z ·B
′, X), and L ← z · J
D) Calculates challenge value
c ←H1(params||A
′||B′||C ′||J ||K||L||ρD||
KUR||tsMR||tsNU )
E) Calculates response value
s ← z + c · fi (mod q)
v) Assembles the signature σNU
σNU ← (A
′, B′, C ′,K, J, c, s)
vi) Sends signature σNU together with D-H key
exchange share, TNU , and timestamp tsNU
MsgNU ← {σNU , TNU , tsNU}
4) MR verifies NU anonymously and obtains the shared
key KUR:
a) Checks if the timestamp tsNU is fresh
b) Computes the shared secret key
KUR ← HK(rMR · TNU )
c) Checks if NU is in UserRL
If ∃fi ∈ UserRL, such that K = fi ·J , then rejects
the signature and aborts the protocol.
d) Checks the correctness of A′ and B′
If eˆ(A′, Y ) 
= eˆ(B′, P2), then rejects the signature
and aborts the protocol.
e) Verifies the Signature (Correctness of Proofs)
i) Performs the following computations
ρ
′
A ← eˆ(A
′, X) ; ρ
′
B ← eˆ(B
′, X) ;
ρ
′
C ← eˆ(C
′, P2) ; ρ
′
D ← (ρ
′
B)
s · (ρ
′
C/ρ
′
A)
−c
L′ ← sJ − cK
ii) Validates the challenge
If c 
= H1(params||A′||B′||C ′||J ||K||L′||ρ
′
D||
KUR||tsMR||tsNU ), then rejects the signature
and aborts the protocol.
f) Allows the user to connect to the network.
Upon successful completion of the protocol, user and
router can use the shared secret key KUR to secure
further communication between them.
• MAKE for User-User Interaction (MAKE-UU)
In case a user cannot find a router within its reception
range but another user already connected to the network,
two users can run a similar algorithm. The only difference
from the previous scheme is that the relaying user also
uses anonymous signature to authenticate to the connect-
ing user. More precisely, the relaying user broadcasts
beacon messages, which he signs using the anonymous
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group signature scheme. As a result, both users mutually
authenticate each other anonymously using their creden-
tials they acquire in Join protocol.
C. User Accountability and Key Revocation
For user accountability, it is necessary to identify misbe-
having users. Our protocol is designed to provide privacy in
the strong sense [4], meaning that it is not possible to deter-
mine whether two signatures are generated by the same user.
However, by performing this protocol on a given signature,
TTP and NO can identify and revoke a user by revealing its
private key. The TTP has the authority of revoking the user.
Note that both TTP and NO maintain a list of pairs, (i, fTTPi)
and (i, fNOi), respectively.
1) User (Private Key) Revocation: If the owner of a
signature σO is to be revoked, signer’s private key is re-
constructed by TTP and NO through the following protocol:
1) TTP performs the following operations:
a) Verifies the signature σO, where σO = {AO, BO, CO,
JO,KO, cO, sO}
b) If the signature verifies, then it sends JO to NO
and requests for the corresponding partial proofs (i.e.,
fNOi · JO for each user).
2) Upon receiving JO, the NO
a) Calculates partial proofs for every registered user
NUi ∈ RU , where RU stands for the list of registered
users and |RU | = n for the number of registered users;
{∀ NU i ∈ RU , fNOi ; KNOi ← fNOi · JO}
b) Sends n proof pairs (i,KNOi) to TTP.
3) Using the proof pairs received from NO, TTP;
a) Calculates corresponding partial proofs using secret
shares in its list:
{∀ NU i ∈ RU , fTTPi ; KTTPi ← fTTPi · JO}
b) Calculates proofs by adding partial proofs KTTPi and
KNOi and compare the result with KO = fi · JO:
i) ∀ NU i ∈ RU , calculate Ki = KTTPi +KNOi and
check if Ki = KO
ii) If ∃i for which Ki = KO then output i as the
corresponding signer
4) On output ’i’, TTP asks for user NUi’s partial private
key value from NO by sending user id ’i’.
5) NO sends corresponding private key share fNOi to TTP.
6) Upon receiving partial secret, TTP
a) Computes secret key fi ← fTTPi + fNOi
b) Adds fi to user revocation list (UserRL) and
c) Adds user id ’i’ in another list to prevent rogue user
from performing Join protocol in future.
IV. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we give security and performance analysis
of our mutual authentication and key agreement architecture.
The proposed architecture provides user-router mutual au-
thentication where only the user is anonymous and user-user
authentication whereby both users remain anonymous after the
authentication.
A. Security Analysis
We assume that there exist pair-wise secure channels con-
necting the NO, the TTP and a user during the Join protocol
where all exchanged information is protected. Since privacy
and anonymity is not an aim of the Join protocol, securing the
Join protocol can be performed using conventional methods.
User Anonymity against other users, NO and TTP: Our
construction makes use of anonymous group signature scheme
[8] to protect the anonymity of a user against the other users,
mesh routers, the NO, and even against the TTP. Since no
single entity within the network knows the private key of any
user, no one is able to identify the owner of a given signature
or link signatures generated by the same user. The TTP cannot
link two signatures by the same user (even if TTP records
the credential-user pairs) since the credential of a user is re-
randomized for every authentication session. To identify, track
(by linking signatures) and revoke a user, the NO and the TTP
have to collaborate and run revocation protocol.
Confidentiality and Integrity: Communicating entities es-
tablish a shared symmetric key to secure their communica-
tions. In our proposal, we use authenticated Diffie-Hellman
procedure to construct such a key between the communicating
parties. A user that wants to connect to the network should
generate random nonces to guarantee that a different key is
generated in every session.
User Accountability: User accountability is made possible
by the revocation capability incorporated into the scheme.
Whenever malicious activity is observed, it can be reported
to the TTP via providing a signature used by the malicious
user for authentication. Then in accordance with the situation,
TTP decides on whether to revoke reported user’s private key
or not. Also, network operator invalidates user subscription
by again utilizing revocation protocol.
B. Performance Analysis
Performance analysis of our scheme, A-MAKE, in terms
of computational and communication overhead is performed
in this section in comparison with the security framework
of PEACE [9]. We do not consider the Join protocol in our
comparison since it is performed once for each user.
Computational Overhead: As seen from Table I, sign
operation requires a single pairing and six elliptic curve
multiplications (i.e., terms 1P and 6G1). The same operations
in PEACE [9], takes two pairings and eight elliptic curve
multiplications. The saving in the number of pairings and
elliptic curve operations are extremely important for resource-
constraint mesh clients.
In our scheme, verification algorithm needs five pair-
ing operations (i.e., 5P ); |UserRL| (i.e., the number of
revoked users) elliptic curve multiplications; single multi-
exponentiation (the term G2M ) and two simultaneous point
multiplications in elliptic curve group G1 (the term G21). On
the other hand, PEACE requires six elliptic curve multipli-
cations in addition to 3 + 2|UserRL| pairing computations.
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Operation Party Cost - AMAKE Cost - PEACE [9]
Join TTP 3P + (2 + |UserRL|)G1 + 2G21
Network User 4P + 3G1 + 1Sign -
Mesh Router 6G1 + 1P
Sign Network User 1P + 6G1 2P + 8G1
Verify Mesh Router 5P + |UserRL|G1 + G2M + G
2
1
(3 + 2|UserRL|)P + 6G1
TABLE I
COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD IN A-MAKE
Considering the user revocation list is not empty, the term
(|UserRL|)G1 in our protocol and 2(|UserRL|)P in PEACE
dominate the computations. Since elliptic curve multiplication
is much faster than pairing operation, our protocol outperforms
the PEACE even for short user revocation lists. For example,
whenever |UserRL| > 2, verification step of A-MAKE is
carried out with less computational overhead than the one
performed in PEACE.
Efficient verification algorithm for anonymous signatures is
a crucial requirement in hybrid mesh network where regular
users also perform verification of anonymous signatures
while they act as routers. In summary, both our signature
generation and verification algorithms are more efficient than
their counterparts in PEACE.
Communication Overhead: In Table II, we provide the
analysis of the communication overhead (due to anonymous
authentication) of A-MAKE along with a comparison with
PEACE. As seen from the table, the computational overhead
Architecture Communication Overhead Total Bit Size
PEACE 2G1 + 5Zq 7q + 2 ≈ 1192
A-MAKE 5G1 + 2Zq 7q + 5 ≈ 1195
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF THE COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD (SIGNATURE SIZES)
of A-MAKE is comparable to PEACE.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed a mutual anonymous authentication and key
agreement framework for wireless mesh networks. Due to
sophisticated yet efficient group signature protocol that is
the pillar of our framework, the protocols are well suited to
WMNs. Registered users can connect to the network from
anywhere a router or another connected user is available
without being identified or tracked. Therefore, our framework
provides the user privacy in the strongest sense and the
user accountability, which has been provided by none of the
previous proposals in the literature.
An important contribution is the three-party Join protocol
that reconciles the user privacy in the strongest sense and user
accountability in an efficient and scalable manner. User revo-
cation is possible only through the collaboration of two semi-
trusted parties, namely the TTP and NO; therefore nobody
can violate the privacy of users alone. Revocation procedure
is efficiently performed under the control of the TTP.
We analyzed the performance of signature generation and
verification algorithms in comparison with similar algorithms
in literature. Our algorithms are more efficient in terms of
computational complexity while the communication overhead
is almost the same.
As a future work, we plan to implement the proposed
framework and previous solutions in a simulation environment
in order to provide some hard figures about the efficiency of
the proposed protocols.
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